Anoneumouse

Dago abuses Coon

2011-12-20T14:27:00.000-08:00

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/liverpool/8967560/Luis-Suarez-fined-40000-and-banned-for-eight-matches-for-racially-abusing-Patrice-Evra.html

A guide dog for the sighted

2011-12-01T07:32:00.001-08:00

Mervyn King has said "What we have to do is to be ready and prepared with contingency plans and to make sure that as far as possible our banking system is as robust as possible to withstand whatever shocks that come from the eurozone,”

I want to be a Border Agency 'Scab'

2011-11-25T10:07:00.001-08:00

I feel it is my patriotic duty to volunteer my labour to break this scum bag strike and protect our borders.

In fact if the government want to set up a voluntary Territorial Reserve type service I will commit to joining it.

SANDY BOTTOMS

2011-06-10T01:05:00.001-07:00

2 Wetters = 1 Sippers
2 Sippers = 1 Gulpers
2 Gulpers = 1 Sandy Bottoms

SANDY BOTTOMS = A rare privilege, being invited to see off a friends entire tot

Happy Birthday Prince Philip

Olympic Rings Logo

2011-06-09T02:15:00.000-07:00

Julia slingo understanding climate change

2011-05-30T14:33:00.000-07:00

Julia slingo understanding climate change

taking the piss out of shit

2011-05-30T11:38:00.000-07:00

The Closet Tory

2009-09-11T12:27:00.000-07:00

The Closet Tory

saxon times

2008-09-03T04:28:00.000-07:00

The Law Lords do the right thing

2006-03-24T03:43:00.000-08:00

The following was written by Helen Szamuely

In an important decision, the Law Lords, led by Lord Bingham, have upheld the right of Denbigh High School in Luton to devise its own uniform – in this case a version of the shalwar kameez – and to exclude anyone who refuses to adhere to it.

The case of Shabina Begum (who is usually flanked by her brother and cousin, both members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organization that openly supports Al-Qaeda and one that has been banned in a number of countries, though not, naturally, in Britain) has been going on for some time but has, now, reached the end. Unless, of course, she and her brother and cousin do go to the ECHR.

Ms Begum’s argument, conveyed by her counsel, Cherie Booth QC, was that the shalwar kameez was not modest enough for her and she had to have the right to wear a full hiljab, an outfit that is completely unsuitable to a school.

Denbigh High School pointed out that the shalwar kameez is worn across the Indian sub-continent (whence Ms Begum’s family originates) and was considered to be perfectly suitable by the many Muslims who attend the school, teach in it and sit on its parent teacher association and the governing body.

There was some debate as to why Ms Begum thought that a shalwar kameez was unsuitable. The school’s lawyers quoted her as opining that it was worn by “unbelieving women” and, therefore, she could not sully herself with it. I expect the hiljab is worn by unbelieving women, too, on occasion, particularly when they have to hide cuts and bruises inflicted on them by their loving families.

Ms Booth QC insisted that the lawyers were not accurate. Apparently Ms Begum did not consider the shalwar kameez suitable for a pubescent and post-pubescent girls. Which opinion, M’lud, is obvious nonsense, as many women of varying ages wear it.

At this point, rather uncharacteristically, I should like to ward off the personal attacks on Ms Booth. She is a barrister and, therefore, takes cases as they come up. I have no idea whether Matrix Chambers has a cab rank system or whether she took this one because it was likely to be high-profile. But if we start saying that barristers must not take on certain cases because they are clearly wrong we undermine the basic notion of both the English and the Scottish legal systems, that everyone has the right to defence.

It is, of course, true that Ms Booth set up the Matrix Chambers, to specialize in Human Rights cases immediately after that particularly contentious piece of legislation had been pushed through Parliament by her husband, the Prime Minister.

While this may not qualify as sleaze, many of us held our noses as we read about it.

Another question is who paid for the Ms Begum and her family through the various appeals (the one to the Law Lords was brought by the school). Not, I trust, the taxpayer.

Having defended, however lukewarmly, Ms Booth QC, I must add that it would be ever so nice to see her in court defending a girl who had managed to escape her family’s imprisonment, having refused to go along with a forced marriage. What price human rights in those cases?

Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir

Google George

2006-01-21T11:20:00.000-08:00

“The Sound of Europe”

2006-01-21T02:24:00.000-08:00

This comming week will see the opening of the Austrian EU Presedency production "The Sound of Europe"

(click to enlarge)

On the 27th 28 of January, together with the European Union Commission, more than 300 personalities from the world of politics, science, arts and the media will deliberate on prospects and proposals for making progress on the European project in view of global challenges. The unease and scepticism people express about Europe will also be addressed, and the underlying causes analysed.

The closing debate on Saturday, 28 January, with the participation of leading European politicians, is entitled “Conducting Europe” and will be broadcast live on ORF2 from 11.00.

Presidency report on the ESDP 10032/05

2005-07-06T13:39:00.000-07:00

Brussels, 13 June 2005 (14.06)(OR. fr,en)
COSDP 395PESC 514CIVCOM 155

from : Council
to : European Council
Subject : Presidency report on the ESDP

Delegations will find attached the Presidency report on the ESDP, as approved by the Council at its meeting on 13 June 2005.
________________________
ANNEX

PRESIDENCY REPORT ON THE ESDP

1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in Brussels in December 2004, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

I. EU operations

– Current operations

3. The European Union force deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the ALTHEA military operation continued its activities on the ground in accordance with its mandate, contributing to the maintenance of a stable and secure environment and supporting the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan, the fight against organised crime and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Coordination with NATO headquarters in Sarajevo was efficient.

The reserves training exercise, which took place in the spring, provided an opportunity to deploy elements of the strategic reserve and to use tactical reserves. It helped strengthen the credibility of the force, and its reputation for effectiveness and determination.
Coordination between the force's activities and the activities of other European Union players in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ensured largely by the European Union Special Representative, thereby strengthening the European Union's coordination and internal cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This allowed an integrated approach, and improved the effectiveness of the European Union's action to support the objectives laid down in the High Representative's mission implementation plan (MIP).

The European Union continued to act in concert with the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation ALTHEA is contributing to the achievement of the EU's long term objective of a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track in its European perspective.

The analysis of lessons learned from the planning phase of the operation has been carried out.

The first six?monthly review of the mission was completed with the Council's approval of the SG/HR' s report. This report recommends that the tasks and mandate of the force should be maintained for the coming six months, and that no significant changes should be made to its size and organisation.

4. During the first half of 2005, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) continued to implement its mandate to improve in particular the administrative management capabilities of the police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In doing so, the EUPM maintained the principle of the "co?localisation" of its personnel with the police chain of command, so that it could advise and monitor the local police and evaluate its performance. The principal

objective of the implementation of EUPM projects and programmes was to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to increase its own policing resources. The EUPM's priorities related to the fight against organised crime, by facilitating the establishment of the SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency) and supporting the process of restructuring police bodies. The EUPM also had the aim of raising the awareness of the local authorities and the public of the need for reliable and effective police. The EUPM launched a large-scale campaign to inform the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. On the basis of the success of its first 12 months in operation, EUPOL PROXIMA in FYROM has focused its activities on the most urgent operational needs in the framework of three programmes: maintaining order, organised crime and the border police. The mission has widened the geographical scope of its responsibilities at national level, while maintaining a stronger presence in the former areas of crisis.

Under the authority of the European Union Special Representative in Skopje, and in partnership with the host Government authorities, PROXIMA police experts continued to supervise, monitor and advise the country's police, focusing on middle and senior?ranking officers.

The mission assisted the FYROM authorities in developing and applying directives from senior police authorities, based on the best international standards, throughout the country. Those directives relate particularly to criminal investigations and the border police.

6. The aim of the EUJUST THEMIS mission in Georgia is to help the Georgian authorities to draw up and to monitor the implementation of a strategy to reform the criminal justice system and to bring it closer to the best international and European standards. In May 2005, the Georgian Government approved the reform strategy, which enabled the mission to enter its third and final phase of operations. This phase consists of monitoring the beginning of the implementation of the reform strategy. The two previous phases of the operation related to analysis of the criminal justice system and to providing advice on drawing up the strategy for reform. Given the expiry of the mandate of EUJUST THEMIS on 15 July 2005, the European Union will ensure that the Georgian authorities continue to benefit from appropriate long-term aid in the area of the rule of law, including initiatives via the EUSR office, by the European Commission and by the Member States.

7. EUPOL Kinshasa, which is the first civilian crisis management mission in Africa, was officially launched on 12 April 2005. Consisting of 29 people, this ESDP operation is to supervise, monitor and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The task of the IPU is to provide protection for the institutions and main transitional Government authorities, and to assist in public security in the capital during the general elections which are to take place in the DRC. The IPU will replace the MONUC "neutral force" which has ensured security in Kinshasa up to now.

8. The EU has created a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC, known as EUSEC DR Congo, with a view to contributing to successful integration of the army in the DRC.

The mission is to provide advice and assistance to the competent Congolese authorities in security matters, taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic norms and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law. This advice and assistance mission, to be launched on 8 June 2005, will be able to identify, and contribute to the preparation of, projects and options which the EU and its Member States will be able to decide to support, particularly as regards the establishment and operation of intermixing centres bringing together combatants from the former armed factions.

9. The Council decided on 21 February 2005 to launch an Integrated Rule of Law mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX. The objective of the mission is to address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and middle?ranking officials in the areas of management and criminal investigation. The mission will also promote closer cooperation between the different players across the Iraqi criminal justice system, strengthen the management capability of senior officials primarily from the police, judiciary and penal system, and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in the context of full respect for the rule of law and human rights. The operational phase will begin on 1 July at the latest. The mission aims to train about 770 people and to cover a twelve?month period up to 30 June 2006. The Council agreed that the training activities would take place in the EU or in the region and that the mission should have a Liaison Office in Baghdad. Depending on how the security situation in Iraq develops, and depending on the availability of adequate infrastructure, the Council will be asked to consider the possibility of training within Iraq.

- Other activities and possible missions in prospect

10. The EU has decided to provide overall substantial support for the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS). Practical arrangements for this support are being examined by the competent Council bodies and are being discussed with the African Union.

11. An EU support office for the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS) has been set up within the framework of the office of the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process. There was an exchange of letters in April 2005 between the Palestinian Prime Minister and the EUSR. The approach is designed to support the Palestinian authority in developing a modern, efficient, responsible police force, providing support for operational priorities and long?term reform.

12. Following a request from the Georgian authorities for EU support in the follow?up to the OSCE border monitoring mission, the EU Special Representative for the Caucasus held consultations with the Georgian authorities in January 2005 and a fact?finding mission took place in February 2005. An increase in the size of the EUSR office in Tbilisi will make it possible to support the necessary institutional reforms and contribute to improving communications between Tbilisi and the border.

13. The EU has begun examining the possibility of support for the Crisis Management Initiative in relation to the peace process in Aceh.

14. The EU has also begun preparations for responding to the African Union request for a putative African Union mission in Somalia.

– Standards of behaviour for operations

15. In order to ensure that all categories of personnel involved in ESDP operations comply with the highest standards of behaviour, a document has been drafted on generic standards of behaviour, which the Council has noted. The document is based on provisions already in force and applied to current ESDP operations. It could be adapted, particularly on the basis of lessons learned from ESDP operations, and taking account of work underway at the United Nations and in other international organisations. This document will be used when planning future ESDP operations.

The Council considers that these standards of behaviour should also be applied, as appropriate, to personnel involved in other types of EU presence in areas of operations, in order to ensure consistency in the EU's approach. The relevant Council bodies have also been encouraged to carry out further work in areas related to standards of behaviour and in the implementation of other specific aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

- Model Agreement on the status of forces

16. The Model Agreement on the status of forces for EU?led military crisis management operations has been approved. The Council has authorised the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, to commit itself on this basis, in future operations of this type, to negotiations with third States to conclude agreements on the status of forces (SOFA) under EU direction. This model agreement contributes to efforts to improve the EU's rapid reaction capabilities, by accelerating the conclusion of specific agreements on the status of forces for each operation.

To complete the picture, work has begun on drafting a model agreement on the status of civilian missions (SOMA).

II. Development of European military capabilities

17. Work has continued on establishing EU Battlegroups which are part of the rapid response capability. A Battlegroups Coordination Conference was held on 11 May 2005. It noted that the commitments made by the Member States will enable the objective set for the initial period of operational capability for 2005 and 2006 to be met: one Battlegroup permanently available. For the first two years of full operational capability, 2007 and 2008, commitments by the Member States, including a third State in accordance with the Council conclusions of 22 November 2004, will make it possible to have two Battlegroups permanently available, except in the second half of 2007, for which the second contribution needed is still awaited. Member States have been encouraged to remedy the situation. Preliminary indications were provided on the availability of Battlegroups for the period beyond 2008. These initial offers are to be confirmed at forthcoming Battlegroups Coordination Conferences.

Conceptual work on Battlegroups continued. In particular, the standards and criteria for Battlegroups were agreed. They will apply with effect from 1 January 2007, when the phase of full operational capability begins. Initial considerations on the question of command and control of Battlegroups have been developed, and work is continuing on training and certification, on logistics and on strategic mobility.

The acceleration of the decision-making and planning process for EU rapid response operations was the subject of a report by the SG/HR, which proposed measures to meet the level of ambition defined by the Council, namely to conduct this process within five days from approval of the crisis management concept by the Council to the decision to launch the operation, in particular for operations involving Battlegroups. On the basis of this report, the Political and Security Committee drew up recommendations which have been approved by the Council.

The amendment of the ATHENA mechanism by Council Decision of 24 January 2005 has also allowed EU tools to be adapted to crisis rapid response requirements.

18. In the context of implementation of the 2010 Headline Goal, the Council approved a Requirements Catalogue incorporating the results of the technical work done to date and elements of the iterative process between the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee. The Catalogue will be the basis for future work. It contains considerations regarding strategic planning hypotheses, the five illustrative scenarios and an initial list of the capabilities required to meet the aims set in the 2010 Headline Goal. The Council will approve the final 2005 Requirements Catalogue once the operational analysis has been applied and its results have been approved.

19. Development of a new questionnaire on the Headline Goal has begun, including the use of NATO software which is being adapted to the European Union's specific needs. At the same time, work has begun on the development of an information collection system and an operational analysis instrument for the EU's needs. Work will be carried out in compliance with the EU capability development mechanism and must involve examining the options and ensuring that these tools provide the best possible response to specific EU requirements.

20. Evaluation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was completed, and the role of the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF) was evaluated in this context. The Council approved the ECAP evaluation report drawn up by the EU Military Committee and the European Defence Agency. The report contains a detailed review of the Project Groups set up under the ECAP, thereby enabling their work to be refocused in the light of the new 2010 Headline Goal. Consequently, most of the Project Groups will migrate to a new, more integrated process associated with the functions and tasks of the European Defence Agency as defined in the Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the Agency, which include coordinating the implementation of the ECAP and any successor plan. The refocusing of the Project Groups is an important element in remedying the shortfalls remaining in the area of military capabilities in relation to the Helsinki Headline Goal. In this respect, the Single Progress Report which the Council took note of, evaluated progress on the development of capabilities and helped determine what work remains to be done. An updated Capability Improvement Chart has been drawn up, to keep the public and media informed.

21. Work on the global approach on deployability continued. The aim is to improve the ability of the EU to deploy forces, in particular with respect to strategic transport – a key enabler for rapid response – by primarily focusing on more effective use of all available means for transport coordination, the idea being to create effective links between the Coordination Centres/Cells.

22. The Presidency presented a non?paper on the maritime dimension of the 2010 Headline Goal including a proposed road map. The purpose of this non?paper was to initiate a process to define the terms of reference and methodology of a study designed to improve information on the Member States' maritime requirements and forces.

III. European Defence Agency

23. Since the beginning of the year, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been fully engaged in implementing its 2005 work programme. The recruitment process is almost complete, and the Agency is about to move into its own building.

24. The Steering Board has met at Minister for Defence level, as well as in the planned special configurations at the level of research and technology directors and armaments directors, pending the first meeting to be held on 21 June 2005 at the level of defence capabilities managers, together providing the impetus needed for the Agency's work. As planned, the head of the Agency submitted a report on the EDA's activities to the Council in May.

25. The EDA has started work on four flagship projects in its four areas of operation: C3 (command, control and communications) in the area of capabilities; combat armoured vehicles in the armaments area; the European defence equipment market, in liaison with the European Commission, for the area of industry and the market; and drones for the research and technology area.

The Council received with satisfaction the action plan adopted by the Steering Board of the Agency on the creation of a European defence equipment market. It asked the Agency to implement the plan swiftly, in particular as regards the voluntary arms acquisition regime.

26. The Steering Board approved a transition plan in connection with the closure of the Western European Armaments Group, and with a view to the gradual transfer of the research and technology responsibilities of the Western European Armaments Organisation, and of its research cell (with respective contracts) in the first quarter of 2006.

27. The development of working relationships has been initiated with the Letter of Intent (L.o.I), the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), NATO, the defence industry and academic institutions, in accordance with the Common Position and the Agency's work programme for 2005.

23. The Agency's first contract was concluded with NATO's Agency NC3A, for an operational analysis contributing to work carried out by the European Union Military Staff on the 2005 Requirements Catalogue. It is a contract on technical assistance for the EU.

IV. Development of European Civilian Capabilities

29. In accordance with Civilian Headline Goal 2008 adopted by the European Council in December 2004, the EU has started a process of strategic planning of its civilian capabilities. The first phase, concluded as planned in April 2005, involved the drawing up of "planning assumptions" and "illustrative scenarios" concerning stabilisation and reconstruction (including substitution missions), conflict prevention (particularly monitoring missions and support for EUSR offices), the targeted strengthening of institutions, and civilian support for humanitarian operations.

30. This process is being managed in close cooperation with that being run by the EU Military Staff as regards the 2010 Headline Goal. Above all, despite the difference in the timetables for the two processes, compatibility must be ensured in civilian/military scenarios, including time limits for intervention and the terminology used. The EU is also taking care to ensure that, where appropriate, there is consistency with the action of other players with whom the EU intends to cooperate at international level in the area of civilian crisis management.

31. Also in the context of the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal, work has begun on the rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities, including the concept of "civilian crisis reaction teams". Following discussions on this subject in Luxembourg in February and in mid?April in Stockholm, the General Secretariat of the Council presented a conceptual document at the end of May 2005.

In parallel, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council have cooperated on developing optimum synergy between work on rapid deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities and the Commission plan to establish identification and planning teams within the Community civil protection mechanism.

32. The Police Unit, together with experts from the Member States, has developed a concept of rapid deployment of police personnel in an EU?led substitution mission. The concept would make it possible to develop interoperability of European police, not just for rapid deployment but also for their coordination and for the establishment of headquarters for a police mission in a substitution context.

33. In the framework of follow-up to the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004, a conference was organised by the Presidency in Brussels on 23 and 24 March 2005 with representatives of NGOs and of civil society, to consider, as part of a conflict prevention approach, possible areas for cooperation between the EU and civil society in crisis management, including in conflict zones, and to address questions of training those involved in crisis management and the links between development cooperation and security.

34. A seminar was organised in Warsaw in March on civilian capabilities development at national level, to analyse the problems of recruiting civilian experts, particularly senior legal and financial staff, as well as coordination and the division of responsibilities between different ministries/government agencies.

V. Civilian/military cell

35. In accordance with the conclusions of the European Councils in December 2003, June 2004 and December 2004, work to implement the Civilian/Military Cell and the operations centre has been actively pursued. The Cell was prepared for by an establishment team and began work on 23 May 2005. The terms of reference and organisation of the EU Military Staff have been amended to take account of the creation of the civilian/military cell and of the new tasks entrusted to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

36. The EU is awaiting responses to its proposals regarding the EU Cell's mandate in SHAPE and the NATO liaison team in the EUMS.

VI. EU-NATO relations

37. The EU and NATO continued to cooperate within the framework of their strategic partnership for crisis management and their permanent relationship. In the context of the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, exchanges of information and consultations took place on the implementation of the ALTHEA operation led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina using NATO's collective resources and capabilities, and on the activities of the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.

38. The EU/NATO Capability Group met periodically for exchanges of views and information to ensure the consistent and mutually enhancing development of military capabilities within the EU and NATO where requirements overlap, including between the EU's Battlegroups and the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). All EU Member States were kept informed about these issues.

VII. Cooperation with international organisations

39. Implementation continued of the agreed texts on relations with the United Nations as regards military and civilian crisis management. Regular contacts took place between the services concerned in the context of the joint consultative mechanism established following the joint declaration by the EU and the United Nations on 24 September 2003. Progress was made in relations between the EU and the United Nations, and is expected particularly in cooperation on the ground between EUPOL Kinshasa and MONUC.

40. An EU Exercise Study was carried out with the participation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The operational conclusions will be implemented through the EU-UN steering committee and monitored by the Political and Security Committee. This work is intended to define the practical arrangements for the transition between an EU operation and a United Nations operation, and to analyse in more detail the nature of and arrangements for the relationship to be established between the two secretariats, both in normal circumstances and in a crisis.

41. Cooperation continued with the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

42. Cooperation also intensified with the African Union and the African subregional organisations.

VIII. Cooperation with third countries

43. As authorised by the Council in February 2004, the Presidency continued the negotiations which had begun with third countries, with a view to concluding agreements establishing a framework for their participation in EU crisis management operations. Negotiations with Bulgaria and Ukraine were completed.

44. In the framework of the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, a joint Road Map for the Common Space on External Security, one of the four EU?Russia common spaces, was agreed on 10 May. This Road Map contains provisions designed to increase EU?Russia dialogue and cooperation in the crisis management area within the agreed framework in order to face regional and global challenges more effectively.

IX. Dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean partners in the field of crisis management

45. A EuroMed Senior Officials meeting on ESDP, co?chaired by the Chairman of the Political and Security Committee, was held on 11 April 2005. This meeting provided an opportunity to address recent developments in the ESDP, and to confirm the interest of the Mediterranean partners in these questions. There was also a first exchange of views on a concrete proposal by the European Union to strengthen its cooperation with the Mediterranean countries in security and defence matters, and to give it more visibility by implementing an annual action plan. A fruitful contribution on the possibilities for cooperation in practice was also made by the Institute for Security Studies in its report on the seminar on 10 May devoted to prospects for dialogue on security and defence matters under the Barcelona Process.

X. ESDP and Africa

46. The Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa aims to support African organisations and States in building autonomous conflict prevention and management capacities, with special attention to the African Union, within the framework of overall EU policy on Africa. In this context, following a field mission in Addis Ababa by the

Politico?Military Working Party, the Political and Security Committee examined operational recommendations to strengthen EU relations with the African Union in the area of peace and security in Africa. These recommendations could be proposed for examination by the African Union's Peace and Security Council.

Implementation of the Action Plan for ESDP support to Peace and Security in Africa took shape in particular with preparations for handing over relevant EU documents to the African organisations.

47. Dialogue between the EU and the African Union (AU), African sub-regional organisations and African States on the potential role of the ESDP in contributing to peace and security in Africa is continuing. The Chairman of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, held exchanges of views with the Political and Security Committee on strengthening links between the EU and the AU and on the situation in Darfur.

48. The EU continued to provide active support for the African Union and for the international community's activities in Darfur, in particular by acting as vice?chair of the Ceasefire Commission and by supporting the political process and the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS). In practical terms, this support took the form of making experts available to help the AU set up and manage the AMIS operation, and the granting of funding through the Peace Facility. An evaluation with which the EU was associated led the AU to decide to reinforce AMIS. EU assistance was requested in planning and putting in place this increased AU presence in Darfur.

At the donors' conference held on 26 May in Addis Ababa, the EU presented a comprehensive and substantial offer including military and civilian elements, particularly police. The relevant Council bodies have already begun looking into the various forms that such support could take, with particular regard to planning, logistics, equipment, strategic and tactical airlift, development of the AU's observation capabilities and training. Consultations have taken place with other players in the international community, particularly the United Nations, NATO, the United States and Canada, who contribute to supporting the AU mission in Sudan.

XI. ESDP and the fight against terrorism

49. On 23 May 2005 the Council endorsed the first report on the implementation of the Conceptual Framework on the ESDP dimension of the fight against terrorism. This report is a living document that will have to be updated regularly. It takes stock of implementation of action points and makes concrete recommendations to be implemented as soon as possible for each action point in the Conceptual Framework.

50. Implementation of the Conceptual Framework covers a vast spectrum of capability and operational sectors, including management of the consequences of a terrorist attack. Amongst the most innovative sectors agreed in the implementation report on the Conceptual Framework, the following might be mentioned: interoperability between military and civilian assets, including civil protection assets; extension of the military database to all natural and man-made disasters; protection in the framework of crisis management operations. Without prejudice to the final decision, work is underway on the proposal to create an NRBC Centre of Competence.

51. Consistency between ESDP activities and other EU instruments is essential and must be promoted to ensure a comprehensive EU response to the multidimensional terrorist threat. The General Secretariat of the Council and the Presidency will provide the interface between all the committees and working parties concerned. The Commission will be involved, within its areas of competence.

52. On 7 March 2005, on the basis of a mandate in the Conceptual Framework, the European Union Institute for Security Studies organised a seminar on the contribution of the ESDP to the fight against terrorism, which allowed areas for further study in this important area to be identified. The seminar also provided an opportunity for more thorough dialogue with the United States on this issue.

XII. EU training in the field of ESDP

53. The concept of EU training in the field of ESDP was successfully implemented. Courses were organised in the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2005 to 2007. The pilot course – a high-level ESDP course – of the future European Security and Defence College ended in March, and an orientation course on the ESDP was organised in Brussels from 28 February to 4 March. On that basis, a final report on training in the ESDP area and an analysis of requirements in this area have been drawn up and approved by the Political and Security Committee. Thus the arrangements for the functioning of the European Security and Defence College have been defined. The necessary conditions to establish the College have been fulfilled in preparation for the 2005/2006 academic year.

Training activities in the area of civilian crisis management are also being conducted under the auspices of the Commission.

XIII. Crisis management exercises

54. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations was involved in the preparation and running of an Exercise Study (EST 05) on 14 and 15 April 2005, which provided an opportunity to analyse in more detail the question of the transition between an EU operation and a UN operation. The scenario called for the robust and rapid deployment of EU military capabilities under the political control and strategic direction of the EU, in support of the United Nations and following its request. The scenario also covered civilian crisis management, with a UN police operation being followed by an EU operation.

55. Preparatory work took place for the EU-Mediterranean Partners Crisis Management Seminar which will take place in Athens from 27 to 29 June 2005. Its proceedings will provide material for subsequent common consideration of the paths to be followed in this area.

56. The EU Exercise Programme for the period 2006?2010 was approved, and preparation began for the CME 06 exercise.

XIV. Role of space applications in the ESDP framework

57. In order to ensure that security and defence aspects are taken into account in the European space programme, inter?pillar exchanges of information took place. An initial road map was established for the effective implementation of the stages identified in the document on European space policy entitled "ESDP and Space" approved by the Council in November 2004.

XV. Action Plan adopted following the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean

58. Following the Action Plan adopted by the Council on 31 January 2005, after the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the Council and its competent bodies examined proposals to strengthen the EU's rapid response capability. In a report to the Council in April, the SG/HR made a number of proposals concerning the mobilisation and use of military resources and consular cooperation in the event of natural or man?made disasters. The May Council surveyed the implementation of the Action Plan on the basis of a note from the Presidency.

XVI. Mandate for the incoming Presidency

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

to continue the successful development of an active ESDP, and in particular:

– to continue to ensure the effective management of Operation Althea, and review the operation taking account of both the wider EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expected evolution of the international community's involvement;

– to continue effective management of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, review the operation and prepare recommendations on its future taking into account the wider EU presence;

– to continue effective management of the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, review the operation and prepare recommendations on follow?up;

– to continue effective management of the EU policing mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to review the mission and to prepare recommendations on its future;

– to ensure effective management of the security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DRC); review the mission, taking account of proposals from the head of mission on further possible assistance;

– to ensure effective management of and review the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq;

– to consider the future of the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support, presently in the office of the EUSR;

– to provide further EU support for the AU operation in Darfur in consultation with other international actors;

– to further work to ensure the sustainability of the achievements of the Rule of Law Mission in Georgia and prepare a lessons learned exercise;

– to implement effectively any other operations that the Council may decide;

to continue work on making ESDP more capable, and in particular:

– to finalise the military Requirements Catalogue 2005 following detailed computer?assisted Operational Analysis of the military assets necessary for the EU to undertake the full range of crisis management operations;

– to finalise the Headline Goal Questionnaire 2005 in preparation for the process of identifying the national contributions necessary to meet these requirements;

– to take forward the study into how best to meet the EU's future requirements for information gathering and computer-assisted operational analysis;

– to take forward work on the EU Battlegroups initiative (as part of Rapid Response elements) on the basis of the agreed Roadmap;

– to take forward work on the Global Approach on Deployability;

– to continue work on the actions identified in the Conceptual Framework on ESDP and Terrorism and the recommendations of the report on its implementation;

– to define the terms of reference and methodology for a study into the maritime dimension of ESDP in the context of the Headline Goal 2010;

– to continue work on the establishment of the civ/mil cell, including its capacity to rapidly generate, when needed, an operations centre for particular autonomous operations;

– to reach agreement on a three-year financial framework for the EDA, within which the budget and the work programme for 2006 can be set;

– to finalise a Civilian Capabilities Requirements List; to issue a call for national contributions against this list; and to agree a capability improvement plan at a Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference. In this context, to take forward work on rapid deployment, notably Civilian Response Teams;

– to take forward work on improving procedures for the procurement of equipment for civilian crisis management operations;

– to continue the implementation of the European Programme for the Prevention of Violent conflict;

to continue work on improving the coherence of EU efforts, through enhancing its ability to undertake joint civil-military operations, in particular:

– to take forward work to improve civ/mil coordination, focusing in particular on a framework to support comprehensive planning for EU operations with civilian and military elements;

– to take forward, in accordance with the action plan adopted by the Council on 31 January 2005, work on improving ESDP-related aspects of the EU's ability to respond rapidly to the aftermath of major disasters;

– to develop the ESDP elements of an overarching EU concept for Security Sector Reform drawing inter alia on the experience from EUSEC DRC;

to maintain the EU's commitment to work with key partners, and in particular:

– to maintain a close EU/UN dialogue, and to contribute to an effective EU response to the High Level Panel proposals on peace and security; and pursue further work in areas related to standards of behaviour and other aspects of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security;

– to continue to build the EU/NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, including through the establishment of an EU cell at SHAPE and a NATO liaison team at the EUMS;

– to maintain and develop further EU cooperation with the AU and African Sub Regional Organisations, both through further support for capacity-building, and further implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan;

– to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Mediterranean partners in the field of ESDP;

– to take forward work on the implementation of the 3rd space with Russia

Here we go, here we go, here we go

2005-05-17T10:11:00.000-07:00

The ricin ring that never was

2005-04-28T08:41:00.000-07:00

The ricin ring that never was

This article was removed from The Guardian http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/comment/0,1320,1459178,00.html _____________________________________________________

Yesterday's trial collapse has exposed the deception behind attempts to link al-Qaida to a 'poison attack' on London

Duncan Campbell
Thursday April 14, 2005
The Guardian

Colin Powell does not need more humiliation over the manifold errors in his February 2003 presentation to the UN. But yesterday a London jury brought down another section of the case he made for war - that Iraq and Osama bin Laden were supporting and directing terrorist poison cells throughout Europe, including a London ricin ring.
Yesterday's verdicts on five defendants and the dropping of charges against four others make clear there was no ricin ring. Nor did the "ricin ring" make or have ricin. Not that the government shared that news with us. Until today, the public record for the past three fear-inducing years has been that ricin was found in the Wood Green flat occupied by some of yesterday's acquitted defendants. It wasn't.

The third plank of the al-Qaida-Iraq poison theory was the link between what Powell labelled the "UK poison cell" and training camps in Afghanistan. The evidence the government wanted to use to connect the defendants to Afghanistan and al-Qaida was never put to the jury. That was because last autumn a trial within a trial was secretly taking place. This was a private contest between a group of scientists from the Porton Down military research centre and myself. The issue was: where had the information on poisons and chemicals come from?
The information - five pages in Arabic, containing amateur instructions for making ricin, cyanide and botulinum, and a list of chemicals used in explosives - was at the heart of the case. The notes had been made by Kamel Bourgass, the sole convicted defendant. His co-defendants believed that he had copied the information from the internet. The prosecution claimed it had come from Afghanistan.

I was asked to look for the original source on the internet. This meant exploring Islamist websites that publish Bin Laden and his sympathisers, and plumbing the most prolific source of information on how to do harm: the writings of the American survivalist right and the gun lobby.

The experience of being an expert witness on these issues has made me feel a great deal safer on the streets of London. These were the internal documents of the supposed al-Qaida cell planning the "big one" in Britain. But the recipes were untested and unoriginal, borrowed from US sources. Moreover, ricin is not a weapon of mass destruction. It is a poison which has only ever been used for one-on-one killings and attempted killings.

If this was the measure of the destructive wrath that Bin Laden's followers were about to wreak on London, it was impotent. Yet it was the discovery of a copy of Bourgass's notes in Thetford in 2002 that inspired the wave of horror stories and government announcements and preparations for poison gas attacks.

It is true that when the team from Porton Down entered the Wood Green flat in January 2003, their field equipment registered the presence of ricin. But these were high sensitivity field detectors, for use where a false negative result could be fatal. A few days later in the lab, Dr Martin Pearce, head of the Biological Weapons Identification Group, found that there was no ricin. But when this result was passed to London, the message reportedly said the opposite.

The planned government case on links to Afghanistan was based only on papers that a freelance journalist working for the Times had scooped up after the US invasion of Kabul. Some were in Arabic, some in Russian. They were far more detailed than Bourgass's notes. Nevertheless, claimed Porton Down chemistry chief Dr Chris Timperley, they showed a "common origin and progression" in the methods, thus linking the London group of north Africans to Afghanistan and Bin Laden.

The weakness of Timperley's case was that neither he nor the intelligence services had examined any other documents that could have been the source. We were told Porton Down and its intelligence advisers had never previously heard of the "Mujahideen Poisons Handbook, containing recipes for ricin and much more". The document, written by veterans of the 1980s Afghan war, has been on the net since 1998.

All the information roads led west, not to Kabul but to California and the US midwest. The recipes for ricin now seen on the internet were invented 20 years ago by survivalist Kurt Saxon. He advertises videos and books on the internet. Before the ricin ring trial started, I phoned him in Arizona. For $110, he sent me a fistful of CDs and videos on how to make bombs, missiles, booby traps - and ricin. We handed a copy of the ricin video to the police.

When, in October, I showed that the chemical lists found in London were an exact copy of pages on an internet site in Palo Alto, California, the prosecution gave up on the Kabul and al-Qaida link claims. But it seems this information was not shared with the then home secretary, David Blunkett, who was still whipping up fear two weeks later. "Al-Qaida and the international network is seen to be, and will be demonstrated through the courts over months to come, actually on our doorstep and threatening our lives," he said on November 14.

The most ironic twist was an attempt to introduce an "al-Qaida manual" into the case. The manual - called the Manual of the Afghan Jihad - had been found on a raid in Manchester in 2000. It was given to the FBI to produce in the 2001 New York trial for the first attack on the World Trade Centre. But it wasn't an al-Qaida manual. The name was invented by the US department of justice in 2001, and the contents were rushed on to the net to aid a presentation to the Senate by the then attorney general, John Ashcroft, supporting the US Patriot Act.

To show that the Jihad manual was written in the 1980s and the period of the US-supported war against the Soviet occupation was easy. The ricin recipe it contained was a direct translation from a 1988 US book called the Poisoner's Handbook, by Maxwell Hutchkinson.

We have all been victims of this mass deception. I do not doubt that Bourgass would have contemplated causing harm if he was competent to do so. But he was an Islamist yobbo on his own, not an Al Qaida-trained superterrorist. An Asbo might be appropriate.

· Duncan Campbell is an investigative writer and a scientific expert witness on computers and telecommunications. He is author of War Plan UK and is not the Guardian journalist of the same name

Jeremy Paxman :o)

2005-04-22T14:48:00.000-07:00

:o)

A MULTINATIONAL FEDERATION WITHOUT A DEMOCRATIC BASIS

2005-04-08T10:48:00.000-07:00

Advocates of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe contend that in the new Union it would establish, the Member States would still have primacy of authority because it is they that would have conferred powers on the Union, under the so-called "principle of conferral"(Art.I-11). They forget that this is how classical-type Federal States have historically developed: by smaller political units coming together and transferring powers to a superior, e.g. 19th century Germany, the USA, Canada, Australia. This contrasts with Federations that have been formed by originally unitary States adopting federal form and devolving power to provinces or regions, e.g. post-War Germany, Russia, Austria, India, Nigeria. Where else after all could Brussels get its powers if not from its Member States, just as the Federal States whose capitals were 19th century Berlin, Washington, Ottawa and Canberra did before it? In the latter cases however the political units that came together to form a Federal State belonged wholly or mainly to one nation, with a common culture, language and history. This gave these Federations a popular democratic basis, and with it a natural legitimacy and authority, in total contrast to the EU Federation-in-the-making, with its many nations, peoples and languages. Therefore the provision of Article I-11 of the EU Constitution: "The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral", does no more than state the obvious.

Once power is conferred on the Federal level under the EU Constitution, however, there is no provision for a Member State to get it back short of withdrawing from the Union. The EU Constitution would indeed allow for this(Art.I-60), as the Constitutions of other Federations have done before it. Joseph Stalin's 1936 Constitution for the USSR contained a provision permitting states to leave it. The southern Confederate states of the USA thought they possessed a right of withdrawal until their attempt to exercise it in practice precipitated the 1860s American civil war. It is hard to find historical examples of individual provincial states exercising a constitutional right of withdrawal from a Federal State. Much more common is for the multinational Federations themselves to break up, so that everyone leaves, as it were, e.g. the USSR, Czechslovakia, Yugoslavia, the West Indies Federation. The historical tendency seems to be for multinational, multilinguistic Federal States to break up, as the international community of States continues to increase. The number of States in the world has gone from some 60 when the United Nations was established in 1945, to nearly 200 today, and the 21st century will certainly see many more new States formed out of existing multinational ones as the process of Nation State formation gets under way in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East.

Those seeking to play down the fact that the proposed EU Constitution is envisaged by its drafters as the fundamental law of another multinational Federation point to the provision of Article I-11 that "Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Constitution to attain the objectives set out in the Constitution." They claim that this puts real restraint on Union power. But again this provision does no more than state the obvious: that the Constitution lays down that the Union and its Member States should respect their mutual powers and functions, as should the authorities of all States governed by law. The real political issue is who would interpret what the EU and Member State powers are? Who would decide in the event of disputes between the Federal and provincial state levels as to their respective fields of competence? The answer is the European Court of Justice, that supranational body that would be the new Union's Supreme Court. A Constitution means what the Supreme Court established to interpret it says it means. The European Court of Justice has been notorious for decades for seeking to expand European supranational power to the utmost through its case-law. The experience of the USA and other Federations has shown that historically their Supreme Courts have exercised an enormous federalizing influence by imposing common legal standards on their different political sub-units. There is no comfort for concerned democrats or "sovereignists" in Article I-11.

Nor is there in the further provision of the same Article: "Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States". Again this states the obvious. It is very similar to the 10th amendment to the American Constitution, adopted in 1791, which provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." This 10th Amendment has not prevented the USA from becoming a fully-fledged Federal State, although in several respects it is less centralised than the present EC/EU. Article I-11 offers no reassurance against similar further centralisation in the new European Union. The defining characteristic of Federations as compared with Unitary States is precisely the division of law-making, executive and judicial powers between Federal and provincial state levels, with the former being constitutionally primary or superior, but with each level supposed to respect the competences of the other - as the Constitution lays down for the proposed new European Union.

There is no reassurance for concerned democrats either in Article I-5.1, which requires the Union to respect the "national identities" of its Member States and "their essential State functions." "Identity" is not the same as independence and is not a justiciable category. A people keeps its identity in servitude as well as freedom - Kurds, Chechyns and Palestinians for example. As for "respect (for) essential state functions", again any law-governed Federation and its constituent states should naturally respect the governmental functions carried out at its different levels. So this provision is another tautology, without potential for practically affecting the actual distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States should the Constitution come into force.

.

NOTICE OF TREASON

2004-11-10T03:59:00.000-08:00

Treason Act 1351
Section 3, Treason Felony Act, 1848
Laying of Information
Names of Suspect

Rt. Hon Peter Benjamin Mandelson "Crown Steward and Bailiff of the manor of Northstead"

Address of Suspect: C/o 10 Downing Street, LONDON SW1

Date:__________________________

To: The Chairman of the Bench,______CARLISLE____________ Magistrates Court,

(Address:)____ Magistrates' Court _____________________________________
_____________Rickergate _______________________________________________
______________CARLISLE ________________________________________________
______________Cumbria __________________________________________________
______________CA3 8QH______________________________________________

Misprision of Treason

I am a loyal subject of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, and wish to remain so. I am aware of her solemn Coronation Oath to the nation in 1953, to govern the British people 'according to their laws and customs'.

As a loyal British subject, it is my duty to bring to your attention any actions or planned actions which may amount to treason or misconduct in a public office by any individual or group of individuals, or which may occur in the future if not prevented, so that the appropriate action can be taken.

It is AN OFFENCE at Common Law ("Misprision of Treason" - see Halsbury's Statutes, 4th Edition, Vol. 11, p. 818) for any person who knows that treason is being planned or committed, not to report the same as soon as he can to a Justice of the Peace.

Accordingly, I am supplying you with the following information about the treason and misconduct in a public office that I humbly believe will or has undoubtedly been committed by Peter Benjamin Mandelson .

(1) Perjury of the Oath of Allegiance;
Took an engagement in the nature of an oath; Intending to bind the accused; To commit treason.

(2) Treason Felony, seeking to divest the Queen of her dominion, since he will be seeking to impose laws made by foreigners within her dominion;

(3) and Treason Proper or High Treason, adhering to the Queen’s enemies within or without the Realm.’

In November of 2004 Pursuant to Article 213 (2) (ex157(2)) of the treaty establishing the European Community, Peter Benjamin Mandelson; Crown Steward and Bailiff of the manor of Northstead not being a person compelled to do so, took an engagement in the nature of an oath intending to bind the said accused to commit an offence namely treason. He freely gave a solemn Oath before the Court of Justice of the European Union “To perform my duties in complete independence, in the general interests of the communities; in carrying out my duties, neither to seek nor to take instruction from any government or any other body; to refrain from any action incompatible with my duties.”

This being treason and misconduct in a public office in direct contradiction to the Oaths he swore as a Member of Parliament for Hartlepool and that, which he swore as a member of Her Majesties Privy Council.

Parliamentary Oath
I ………. swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, her heirs and successors, according to law. So help me
God.

Privy counsellors Oath;

You do swear by Almighty God to be a true and faithful Servant unto The Queen’s Majesty as one of Her Majesty's Privy Council. You will not know or understand of any manner of thing to be attempted, done or spoken against Her Majesty's Person, Honour, Crown or Dignity Royal, but you will lett and withstand the same to the uttermost of your power, and either cause it to be revealed to Her Majesty Herself, or to such of Her Privy Council as shall advertise Her Majesty of the same. You will in all things to be moved, treated and debated in Council, faithfully and truly declare your Mind and Opinion, according to your Heart and Conscience; and will keep secret all matters committed and revealed unto you, or that shall be treated of secretly in Council. And if any of the said Treaties or Counsels shall touch any of the Counsellors you will not reveal it unto him but will keep the same until such time as, by the consent of Her Majesty or of the Council, Publication shall be made thereof. You will to your uttermost bear Faith and Allegiance to the Queen's Majesty; and will assist and defend all Jurisdictions, Pre-eminences, and Authorities, granted to Her Majesty and annexed to the Crown by Acts of Parliament, or otherwise, against all Foreign Princes, Persons, Prelates, States, or Potentates. And generally in all things you will do as a faithful and true Servant ought to do to Her Majesty so help you God.

Juramentum est indivisibile, et non est admittendum in parte verum et in parte falsam. (An oath is indivisible; it cannot be in part true and in part false).

May I remind the court that, ignorance is no excuse and Halsbury's Laws of England confirms that a breach of Magna Carta is an offence at common law. This provision is the reason why Crown servants take Oaths. The Bill of Right 1689 specifies the form of the oath and the current wording of the parliamentary oath was established in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868.

May I respectfully refer you to Archbold, Section 25, dealing with "High Treason". There, the Treason Act 1351 is cited with approval. In Section 25.9, the following is a quotation from the case of Fost.C.L. (183): "High Treason, being an offence committed against the duty of allegiance, it may be proper to consider from whom and to whom allegiance is due. With regard to natural born subjects, there can be no doubt. They owe allegiance to the Crown at all times and in all places natural allegiance is founded on the relation every man standeth in to the Crown considered as the head of that society whereof he is born a member the duty of allegiance ariseth out of it and is inseparably connected with it." The commentary in Archbold continues: "The subjects of the King owe him allegiance".

First, the Treason Act 1351 is still in place. This states that the offence of treason is committed, inter alia, "when a man be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm". This of course remains good law despite the amendments to the various Treason Acts in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. An oath recently sworn by the said Peter Benjamin Mandelson to the Court of Justice of the European Union, demonstrates his wish to perjure his oath of allegiance and to undermine the British constitution.

Treason may be committed by words spoken or in writing - see the cases of R. v. Wedderburn (1746) R. v. Francia (1717) and R. v. Watson (1817).

See also (Specifically)

R v. John Eadon (1813) ER 1064, R v William Edgar (1817) ER 145

Under the Treason Felony Act 1848, it is treason if "any person whatsoever [shall, within the United Kingdom or without] devise or intend to deprive our most gracious Lady the Queen from the style, honour or Royal Name of the Imperial Crown of the United Kingdom".

It also states that it is treason if "any person whatsoever shall, within the United Kingdom or without devise or intend to put any force or constraint upon both Houses or either House of Parliament".

Treaty establishing the European Community Article 213 (2) (ex157 (2)) The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Each Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the Members of the Commission in the performance of their tasks. The Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. In the event of any breach of these obligations, the Court of Justice may, on application by the Council or the Commission, rule that the Member concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance with Article 216 or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead.

May I refer you to the Treason case of R. v Casement (1917). In that decision, it was stated that "the offence of treason is committed by persons adhering to and giving aid and comfort to the King's enemies".

The Casement decision referred to the Treason Act 1543, which I believe still to be good law. It may be unprecedented for an appointed UK commissioner to commit Treason, but then the Court itself said: "The Court is not much impressed by the fact that there is very little precedent for a trial the nature of which we are dealing with today" (All ER Reports [1916-17] page 216).

It is further stated in this decision that "The subjects of the King owe him allegiance". To transfer powers from Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Government to the European Union to the extent that is envisaged suggests that Peter Benjamin Mandelson does not owe Her Majesty full allegiance and indeed is seeking to undermine her authority.

The case of R. v. Casement is also quoted in support of the following proposition: "Any act done by a British subject which weakens or tends to weaken the power of the Queen and of the country to resist or attack the enemies of the Queen and country, constitutes giving aid and comfort to her enemies within the meaning of [The Treason Act 1351]".

The offence of misconduct in public office was defined in Russell On Crime, 12th Edition (1964) (J W Cecil Turner) in this way:

"Where a public officer is guilty of misbehaviour in office by neglecting a duty imposed upon him either at common law or by statute, he commits a misdemeanour and is liable to indictment unless another remedy is substituted by statute. The liability exists whether he is a common law or a statutory officer; and a person holding an office of important trust and of consequence to the public, under letters patent or derivatively from such authority, is liable to indictment for not faithfully discharging the office."

In R v Wyat (1705) 1 Salk 380, it was held, that where an officer neglects a duty incumbent upon him, either by common law or statute, he is for his default indictable.

Lord Mansfield stated in R v Bembridge (1783) 3 Doug K B 32:
"Here there are two principles applicable: first, that a man accepting an office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in his office; this is true, by whomsoever and in whatsoever way the officer is appointed…… secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud or imposition, in a matter concerning the public, though as between individuals it would only be actionable, yet as between the King and the subject it is indictable. That such should be the rule is essential to the existence of the country".

In R v Borron (1820) 3 B&Ald 432, a criminal information was applied for against a magistrate. Abbott CJ stated, at page 434:

"…..They [magistrates] are indeed, like every other subject of this kingdom, answerable to the law for the faithful and upright discharge of their trust and duties. But, whenever they have been challenged upon this head, either by way of indictment, or application to this Court for a criminal information, the question has always been, not whether the act done might, upon full and mature investigation, be found strictly right, but from what motive it had proceeded; whether from a dishonest, oppressive, or corrupt motive, under which description, fear and favour may generally be included, or from mistake or error. In the former case, alone, they have become the objects of punishment. To punish as a criminal any person who, in the gratuitous exercise of a public trust, may have fallen into error or mistake belongs only to the despotic ruler of an enslaved people, and is wholly abhorrent from the jurisprudence of this kingdom."

In R v Llewellyn-Jones [1968] 1 QB 429, the Registrar of a County Court was convicted of offences of misbehaviour in a public office. The indictment charged "misbehaviour in a public office, contrary to common law" and alleged that court orders had been made "with the intention of gaining improper personal advantage and without proper regard to the interest of [a named person]". On appeal to this court, it was submitted that, in the absence of allegations of fraud or dishonesty in the counts of the indictment, the ingredients necessary to constitute a criminal offence were not present. Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Parker CJ referred to Bembridge and to Borron and stated, at page 436G:

"Accordingly the court proposed to take the same line as the trial judge did when he came to rule on the argument presented before him, when he said that he did not propose to attempt to give an exhaustive definition of what was covered by misbehaviour in a public office, it being sufficient to say that in his opinion what was alleged and what he proposed should be alleged in the count was sufficient. This court proposed to take the same line and to look at the words of the indictment, and looking at those words the court is satisfied that at any rate what is there alleged, if proved, would constitute the offence at common law of misbehaviour in a public office.

Assuming in [Counsel’s] favour that there must be some element of dishonesty involved, a dishonest motive, a fraudulent motive, it seems to this court that that is inherent in the words of the count. It is really impossible to conceive of a case in which action of this sort is not taken with the intention of gaining personal advantage and without regard to the interests of the beneficiary. It is true the word "dishonestly" or "fraudulently" does not there appear, but it is inherent in the description of the offence."

This information has been laid by:
Anoneumouse, Carlisle, Cumbria, CAX XXX

N.B. Practice Directions by the Lord Chief Justice for the Classification of the Business of the Crown Court and Allocation to Crown Court Centres

With the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor and pursuant to sections 75(1) and (2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, I direct that, with effect from October 16th 2001, the following directions shall supersede those given on May 26, 1995 as amended:

Classification

For the purposes of trial in the Crown Court, offences are to be classified as follows:
Class 1:
(1)Misprision of treason and treason felony.
(2) Murder.
(3) Genocide.
(4) Torture, hostage-taking and offences under the War Crimes Act 1991
(5) An offence under the Official Secrets Acts.
(6) Soliciting, incitement, attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above offences.

.